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1 Introduction 
 
The emission test scandal of German Volkswagen diesel engines, which became public in September 
2015, is just another piece of evidence that making the world a better place represents a challenging 
mission.1 Soon, the French Renault was charged with a similar fraud.2 The history of economic 
scandals is impressive indeed. The car industry, however, represents an atypical example of industries 
where firms have failed to commit to sound business ethics in the past. The American company 
Enron—known for its high-ranked business values—was caught cheating its investors, its workers, 
and the public in the 1990s. The company was one of the largest and most respected among those 
listed in the US stock exchange.3 Enron’s fraud created substantial mistrust in the US economy—and 
this company was not the only one. Other betrayers of US capitalism included Arthur Andersen in 
auditing, WorldCom in telecommunications, Merck in pharmaceuticals, and Time Warner in 
entertainment, among others. They all were accused of sabotaging social values. International 
business scandals from earlier decades include the multinationals Nestlé, Shell, and Nike in particular, 
which have all been the subject of long-lasting consumer boycotts.4 
 
Trust, representing the most important capital in a market economy, can be supported by private 
individuals, consumes and firms. Corporate social responsibility in maintaining established values 
and norms can be supported by disciplinary mechanisms imposed by the markets and eventually by 
the law. Both of them create punishments against the opportunists. Baron (2001), Kochen (2006) and 
Besley and Chatal (2007) presumably were the first to formally set up the issue of socially responsible 
activities in the context of privately produced public goods. They advocated the view that it is not the 
                                                          
1 Volkswagen cars being sold in America had software in diesel engines that could detect when they 
were subject to testing, changing the performance accordingly to improve results. The engines 
emitted nitrogen oxide pollutants up to 40 times above what is allowed in the US. The company's 
strategy was apparently based on the acceptance of the risk of being caught.  
2 It is believed that Renault has cheated on pollution tests for more than 25 years for diesel and 
petrol engines with the knowledge of top management. Test levels of emissions performance of 
some of these cars and the on-road levels showed a difference of up to 377%. Moreover, the 
Japanese car producer Mitsubishi was caught in Spring 2016 for long-term frauds in testing the 
gasoline consumption of its cars. 
3 For details, cf. Healy and Palepu (2003). 
4 Nestlé’s reputation suffered after selling an inappropriate breast milk substitute to pregnant 
mothers in developing countries. Shell Oil suffered damage to its image when the Nigerian 
government took military action against domestic protests aimed at protecting the delta of its river. 
Nike was criticised for abusive working conditions in overseas apparel. A much smaller but 
interesting case includes the Estonian company Tallink. Its ship was caught releasing waste into the 
Baltic Sea in 2005. After the passengers’ initiative to organise a boycott against the company, and 
fearing the loss of its customers, it quickly announced a policy change, pledging to safely release 
waste into containers in the harbour.  
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government after all, but the private actors in the market, that create the fragile social capital. In his 
early influential writing, Friedman (1970) was concerned about the survival of firms that do not focus 
on profit-making. Shleifer (2004) argued, however, that the erosion of corporate ethics may be a result 
of intensified competition. Subsequently, Hörner (2002) suggested that the reputation effects help to 
maintain corporate ethics. Frank (2004) found several mechanisms whereby a firm that incurs 
additional costs beyond what is required by law is nonetheless able to prosper in competition with the 
more opportunist rivals. Porter and Kramer (2011) came up with a competing idea in their Creating 
Shared Value (CSV), in which they proposed a step toward developing corporate social responsibility 
into a new business concept. They suggested redefining the role of business in society from the 
perspective of the interdependence of a company’s success and social progress; companies could 
redefine their aim as creating “shared value”, i.e., not only creating economic value but also societal 
value at the same time. 
In the markets, boycotts represent collective actions against the deviators. These actions have been 
raised against firms using the products of old growth forests, firms that bring products of genetically 
modified contents to the market, or those that use child labour, exploit the rainforest, pollute the 
environment, or resort to using animals in cosmetic testing, to mention some examples.5 
 
The boycott movements indicate that there is a market for morality and that moral principles can be 
priced in the marketplace. There is indeed a substantial literature in the area of consumer boycotts in 
consumer and marketing research, cf. Friedman (1999) and Koku (2011). In the economic literature, 
Baron (2001) suggested, however, that the activists and the firm may bargain to settle the boycott, 
and that the boycotts are unlikely to arise in equilibrium as the target firms rationally agree. In Baron 
(2002), the duration of boycotts was affected by the intransigency of the players. Deirmeier and Van 
Mieghem (2005) suggested that multiple equilibria may arise as the selected equilibrium depends on 
the switching costs, the threshold for the success of the boycott, and the importance of the social 
dimension of the boycott. Innes (2006) considered the boycotts a game between a duopoly industry 
and an environmental organisation. Delacote (2009) suggested that boycotts are often ineffective 
because of coordination issues, free riding, and the high opportunity cost to those who boycott. Some 
earlier work has been more explicit in the motives of the consumers, integrating the economic and 
sociological approaches. Their self-respect was introduced in Kanniainen and Pietarila (2006) while 
Glazer, Kanniainen, and Poutvaara (2010) considered consumers who opportunistically chose to mis-
signal their type to their fellow citizens mimicking responsible citizens. In Heijnen and van der Made 
(2012), a firm knows that consumers are concerned about its ethical standards, but it does not know 
how much they care.  
The existing literature has, however, abstracted from a key mechanism in getting consumers active: 
a group identity effect. Many people want to do something important in their lives. They want to be 
part of a process that makes a difference. They appreciate the option of belonging to a group with a 
social mission. Such a motive is indeed the regularity identified by the large research in social 
psychology. The group identity theory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) defines a social group 
as people who interact with one another, share similar characteristics, and collectively have a sense 
of unity. The subsequent social psychological work on the group effect includes Simon (2004), Brown 
and Capozza (2006), and Reicher, Haslam, Spears, and Reynolds (2012). The group that people 
belong to is an important source of pride and self-esteem. Membership in a group with a social 
mission is apparently based on moral feelings inside human beings. Such feelings witness the 
existence of “conscience”, what Adam Smith called impartial spectator in his Theory of Moral 
                                                          
5 Innes (2006) reports, for example, that between 1988 and 1995, over 200 firms and more than a 
thousand products were the subject of organised boycotts in the US.  
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Sentiments.6 For a further discussion on the motives of a boycott, see also Braunsberger and Buckler 
(2011). 
 
The current paper asks two questions. First, what difference does it make for the market’s ability to 
impose corporate social responsibility in a world where group identity potentially enhances consumer 
power? The key idea is to model the incentive to join the group in terms of the utility derived from 
social group identity, i.e. being member of the boycotting group. This utility is assumed to increase 
with the size of the group resulting in a cascade effect: the more consumers join the group, the higher 
is the incentive of others to join it. Second, what difference does it make for the potential cascade 
effect in a world with large global firms in contrast to small local firms?  
Earlier, group effects were studied in economics in terms of herd behavior in economic and social 
contexts (Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Subsequently, Kuran (1997) 
discussed preference falsification, the act of misrepresenting one’s wants under perceived social 
pressures. He suggested that a common effect of preference falsification is the preservation of 
widely disliked structures. The conferment of an aura of stability on structures is, however, 
vulnerable to sudden collapse. When the support of a policy, tradition, or regime is largely 
contrived, a minor event may activate a bandwagon that generates massive yet unanticipated 
change.7 
 
The paper considers the market actions by two types of people. The first type does not commit to 
moral actions in isolation from other people. These people participate in socially valuable actions 
only as group members. The second type of people have stronger personalities and an ability to 
commit to moral actions, even without group membership if they choose so. They can also adopt 
opportunist behavior. The first type of people are called “group-dependent consumers”, and the 
second type can be called “independent consumers”. 
The paper reports some charming results. In the case of group dependent consumers, powerful 
cascade effects can indeed arise.  Therefore, strong disciplinary mechanisms can be detected in the 
market. With group-dependent consumers, a responsible firm (to be called an H-firm) can manipulate 
its pricing policy to drive a non-responsible firm (an L-firm) out of the market. However, and in 
addition, the customers of the H-firm are able to discipline the H-firm itself by committing not to buy 
at the H-firm. An industry equilibrium emerges where – in anticipation of the ex post verdict of 
consumers – the type L-firms will not enter the market in the first place. No post-entry boycott needs 
to take place and is not observed.  Though latent. i.e. not visible in the recorded statistics, the factual 
boycott size is large. 
In the case of more independent consumers, opportunism among the competing firms limits but does 
not eliminate the prospects for the spreading of the meme of ethical principles. The paper establishes 
                                                          
6 Related social and economic studies on ethical behavior in terms of altruism and empathy are 
supported by the biological research, which has identified the role of oxytocine in controlling our 
moral feelings (Marsh et al. 2015). Group behaviour in the marketplace appears to provide a helpful 
joint research area for evolutionary studies, psychology, and social sciences, including economics in 
the spirit of Wilson’s consilience, suggested by Wilson (1999). Apparently, economic behaviour 
cannot be understood without understanding what kind of human beings we are. Human beings 
cannot be understood unless we understand where we come from. We know today that cooperation 
within established norms has been a successful strategy, though the temptation of opportunism is 
always present. 
7 See also Sunstein (2017). 
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conditions for the mixed industry equilibrium with a less dramatic cascade effect, i.e. both ethical and 
unethical firms surviving in the market. In terms of the output distribution, there is a unique self-
fulfilling rational expectations industry equilibrium determining the distribution of the ethical code 
of firms. Unlike in Baron (2001), boycotts arise in the equilibrium despite symmetric information. 
The intensity of the group identity determines the success of the boycott. This differs from Innes 
(2006), who suggests that in an equilibrium, boycotts are small and persistent against the small firms, 
and large and transitory against the large firms. When there is rivalry, the ethical firm will gain from 
the boycott while the unethical firm will lose. This is different from Heijnen and van der Made (2012), 
who study an industry with a single firm. The ex ante expectations of the size of the potential boycott 
shape the distribution of the ethical code of firms as the customers choose the firm whose door they 
will open. Such ex ante effects have an important implication: the effectiveness of the consumer 
boycotts cannot be measured by data on realised boycotts!  
When it comes to analysing the effects of competition, the current paper challenges the concerns of 
both Friedman and Shleifer, suggesting that it is competition between firms that helps in imposing 
the ethical discipline. In the models developed in the paper, the adoption of the ethical code of conduct 
can be the superior strategy. 
When it comes to comparing small local firms versus large global ones, differences in the costs of 
monitoring become relevant. The suggestion is that the transmission of knowledge has become more 
effective globally, resulting in intensified competition for market shares. The links of the small local 
firms to the rest of society are, instead, weaker and such firms are supposed to have more limited 
incentive to pay attention to their ethical code. The large firms in particular are the targets of the 
collective actions of consumers having built a group identity with a social mission.  
Despite such good news, the paper suggests limits to optimism. People can behave as free riders and 
give up their group identity. Anticipating such opportunism, the firms may abstain from committing 
to a responsible strategy. Small firms cannot be monitored effectively and the deviators may therefore 
be concentrated among them rather than among the large firms. One of the key insights of the paper 
is that as a result, small firms are not the subject of the group identity effect like the large ones are. 
The effectiveness of boycotts is hard to test, however, when firms pay ex ante attention to them when 
choosing their ethical code of conduct. The small number of detected frauds may not be a signal of 
ineffectiveness, but rather of effectiveness. 
 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 Competition and firms’ code of conduct 
 
In the face of competition with their rivals, firms can fall into the temptation of opportunistic 
behaviour, as suggested by Shleifer (2004). Alternatively, they can try to beat their rival in the market 
by building up a corporate culture, representing a long-term commitment to an ethical standard, and 
abstaining from short-term profitable opportunism. 
5 
 
The real-world experience provides a justification to the interpretation that often, perhaps typically, 
the markets exhibit a mixture of both responsible and unresponsible firms. An economic model is 
needed to explain the distribution of firms’ culture in an industry.  
In the model economy of the current paper, competing firms produce identical products, are engaged 
in Bertrand price competition, and can choose different corporate ethics, differentiating their image 
among the consumers. It is assumed that there are two firms, A and B. Firms can adopt a non-ethical 
code of conduct as a pure strategy, say by polluting. Alternatively, a firm can adopt a code of ethical 
conduct. The key structural assumption is that “doing good” is costly. It requires an investment, k > 
0. Another key mechanism is that the cost is firm-specific. When a firm undertakes the investment, it 
is called an H-firm; if it does not, it is called an L-firm. To make such an investment, a firm has to 
train its workers, make contracts, etc., and some firms are more effective than others in doing all of 
this. In our model, firm A is a low-cost firm and firm B is a high-cost firm, 𝑘𝐴 < 𝑘𝐵.  
There are three stages (0,1,2) in the model. In stage 0, firms undertake a cost-benefit analysis of their 
preferred corporate culture, choosing their ethical code, and they form their expectations about the 
size of the consumer alliance protesting against the firm, which chooses L as its ethical code of 
conduct. In stage 1, firms enter Bertrand price competition in the market and consumers observe the 
firms’ ethical code perfectly (Section 2) or imperfectly (Section 3) and are relocated among firms. In 
stage 2, the firms adjust their output in light of the consumers’ locations.  
 
2.2 Social group identity among consumers 
 
The mass of consumers is scaled to one. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the product. The 
consumers are indexed by x ε [0,1] in declining order in respect to their basic willingness to pay. 
Consumer x = 0 is endowed with the highest willingness to pay,  β0 > 0; consumer x = 1 has zero 
willingness to pay. Willingness to pay by the rest of the consumers is uniformly distributed on (0,  β0). 
If the highest willingness to pay is “high”, the product can be viewed as a necessity for many 
consumers. Alternatively, some of them may attach a strong loyalty to the product arising from habit 
formation. In the current section, it is assumed that the consumers are able to monitor the firms and 
identify their type in stage 1.  
 
The novel idea in the current analysis is that consumers are sensitive to social group effects as 
suggested by social psychology. Their moral stance reflects their preference for membership in a 
social group with a mission. In what follows, however, we will qualify the role of the social group. 
We call “group-dependent consumers” those who take the moral position only as a group member. 
We call “independent consumers” those who are able to commit to moral actions and to a normative 
position independently of the group.  
There is a consumer with zero cost of organising such a boycotting group; other consumers may join. 
The expected size of the group is given by X. Those who join will enjoy αX as a private benefit, where 
α > 0 is the intensity of the social identity. This utility is assumed to increase with the size of the 
group resulting: the more consumers join the group, the higher is the incentive of others to join it. 
The private cost of joining the boycotts is assessed in terms of the higher price consumers must pay. 
However, even though they value membership in a group, they can be a potential subject of 
opportunism if the price distribution in the market justifies becoming a traitor. Anything is on sale in 
people’s world—even morality! 
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In equilibrium, the market structure may have both firms engaging in ethical conduct (HH), or only 
one firm (HL) or neither firm engaging in it (LL). Corner solutions may thus arise. The view advocated 
in the current section is that LL and HH are atypical market structures as they result in a price 
undercutting incentive for firms, hence zero profits. Much of the existing literature on industrial 
organisation has emphasised that to make positive profits, firms have an incentive to differentiate 
their products. Similarly, in the current model, firms tend to have an incentive to choose a different 
corporate culture—though secrectly—as similarity, not to mention that mimicking implies zero 
profits.8 
The effects of the social group identity on a firm’s ethical code has not been studied so far. It is thus 
possible that firms’ expectations of consumer group pressure are relevant, and that in today’s world, 
large firms in particular can be expected to pay attention to it. Small firms may have a more limited 
risk of being caught and may be able to avoid the group pressure. 
 
2.3 Social group effect: the case of group-dependent consumers 
 
Each individual consumer and firm takes the expected boycott size X as exogenous while it is 
endogenous in market equilibrium. Expectations of the boycott size can, however, be decisive for a 
dependent individual’s decision to join. If the cost of ethical code is high and equal across firms, both 
firms will be type L in equilibrium. If the costs are low, both firms will be type H. Under cost 
differences, a mixed equilibrium may arise where the low-cost firm is type H and the high-cost firm 
is type L. To see this, we introduce the following market analysis. 
With group-dependence, the indirect utilities of consumers (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) with 𝑥𝑖 participating in the group 
action of not buying at the L-firm and 𝑥𝑗 becoming an opportunist buying at the L-firm are  
 
                           𝑢𝑖 = β0(1 − 𝑥𝑖) + 𝛼𝑋 − 𝑝𝐻;       𝑢
𝑗 = β0(1 − 𝑥𝑗) − 𝑝𝐿,                             (1) 
 
with the prices denoted by (𝑝𝐻, 𝑝𝐿). The idea is that a consumer subject to a group identity effect 
values the group membership, the greater the reference group will be.9 It follows that the number of 
buyers at the H-firm and at the L-firm are (𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑛), respectively, with 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑚 ≤ 1, 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑛 ≤ 1.  
It holds for the last buyer at the L-firm who is indifferent at buying and not buying that 
 
                                        β0(1 − (𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛)) − 𝑝𝐿 = 0.                                                        (2) 
  
                                                          
8 Such a proposal implies that unlike the results in the Cournot-Nash competition (Kanniainen-
Pietarila, Glazer-Kanniainen-Poutvaara), the prisoners’ dilemma will not arise under the Bertrand 
competition. 
9 To simplify the technicalities, it is assumed that all agents in the model share the same 
expectations. 
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The buyer’s index is thus 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛. Moreover, it holds for any customer of the H-firm, say 𝑥𝑏, 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑏 ≤ 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛, that the utility from the product of firm H added with the utility of the group 
membership has to be equal to the utility from the product of the L-firm, both net of the prices, 
 
                                    β0(1 − 𝑥𝑏) + 𝛼𝑋 − 𝑝𝐻 = β0(1 − 𝑥𝑏) − 𝑝𝐿,                                     (3) 
 
Therefore, the price difference is fully determined by the social group effect, 
 
                                                       𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 = 𝛼𝑋.                                                                (4) 
 
Interestingly enough, under such a price structure, all non-marginal consumers at the H-firm are 
indifferent to buying at the H-firm and at the L-firm, even though the willingness to pay schedule is 
declining. 
 
Lemma 1. The group-dependent customers are all indifferent to buying at the H-firm and buying at 
the L-firm once the price difference satisfies (4). 
 
Therefore, given the expected size of the boycott, X, and the intensity of the social group identity, 𝛼, 
one can solve from the model for the price differential and the total number of active buyers in the 
market, 𝑥𝑚+𝑥𝑛. 10 
It is easy to show that the H-firm can fully dictate the pricing of the L-firm. Suppose that the L-firm 
plans to have 𝑝𝐿 > 0. The condition (4) tells, however, that the H-firm can undo this by its own 
aggressive pricing. In particular, if the H-firm expects a large consumer boycott against the L-firm, it 
can choose a large price differential relative to the price of the rival L-firm. Even worse for the L-
firm, the H-firm can choose a price low enough to make the rival leave the market, 
 
                                                        𝑝𝐿 = 𝑝𝐻 − 𝛼𝑋 ≤ 0.                                                         (5) 
 
This means that 𝑝𝐿 = 0, and therefore 𝑥𝑛 = 0. Under such a strategy, the price of the H-firm satisfies 
                                                             𝑝𝐻 = 𝛼𝑋.                                                                    (6) 
 
It follows moreover that the indirect utility of the customer of the H-firm with an index 𝑥𝑚 is 
 
                                   β0(1 − 𝑥𝑚) + 𝛼𝑋 − 𝑝𝐻 =  β0(1 − 𝑥𝑚).   
                                                          
10 In this case, there is only one demand function. 
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It follows that as long as β0(1 − 𝑥𝑚) ≥ 0, buying the product is utility-increasing for a consumer. 
This means, then, that  𝑥𝑚 = 1, and that the H-firm obtains all the customers. 
How do we know that it is optimal for the H-firm to impose 𝑝𝐿 ≤ 0? Make the counter assumption: 
assume that the H-firm allows 𝑝𝐿 > 0, making the L-firm enter the market. This then means that 𝑝𝐻 >
𝛼. Condition (2) then implies that 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛 < 1, i.e., some potential customers do not buy. Even more 
dramatic for the H-firm, those who buy are fully indifferent to buying at the H-firm or at the L-firm. 
This is a risk to the H-firm; it is unable to tie the consumers into itself.  Thus, though the H-firm is 
able to charge a high price for its remaining customers, it may lose all of them to the rival. It is 
legitimate to argue that even a risk-neutral (not to mention risk-averse) firm will not accept such a 
gamble and will settle at pricing its product cheap enough to impose 𝑝𝐿 ≤ 0 with 𝑝𝐻 = 𝛼𝑋, as 
suggested above. 
 
2.4 Equilibrium under rational expectations 
 
Above the ex ante expectations of the boycott size were denoted by X. In a rational expectations 
equilibrium, the expectations concerning the boycott size have to match with its true size. Thus, it 
must hold that 
                               
                                                                 𝑋 = 𝑥𝑚 = 1.                                                             (7) 
 
This implies that in the rational expectations equilibrium, the price of the H-firm must be equal to 𝛼. 
This is a sharp result. 
 
Lemma 2. Under rational expectations concerning the boycott size, the price of the responsible firm 
equals the intensity of the boycotting social group, 
                                                                   𝑝𝐻 = 𝛼.                                                                    (8) 
The rational expectations equilibrium is unique. 
 
With 𝑝𝐻 = 𝛼 and 𝑥𝑚 = 1, the profit of the H-firm then is 
 
                                                             𝜋𝐻 = 𝛼 − 𝑘𝐴.                                                                  (9) 
 
Its survival condition is given by 𝛼 > 𝑘𝐴. 
We have obtained some sharp conclusions pointing to strong disciplinary mechanisms in the market 
with group-dependent consumers. An H-firm indeed is able to drive an L-firm out of the market with 
its pricing policy. Moreover, the customers of the H-firm are able to discipline the H-firm by an 
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implicit threat of not to buy at the H-firm. Though latent and not visible in the recorded statistics, the 
potential boycott size is large. 
We have proven a powerful cascade effect: 
Proposition 1. (Effective boycott) With group-dependent consumers, and with the given expected 
social identity effect, the L-firm is driven out of the market and all consumers who value the product 
will buy at the H-firm. A firm with an ethical code of conduct is able to discipline the firm that has 
not adopted the ethical code. Moreover, it holds that the consumers of the ethical firm are able to 
discipline the pricing of the firm that adopts the ethical code. 
This result contrasts with Shleifer’s (2004) prediction, which suggested that competition leads to the 
deterioration of ethical values. The consumers can indeed steer the market. Notice moreover that even 
though the expected boycott size is small, its effect is strong enough to drive the L-firm is out of the 
market. Interestingly enough, even though the expected boycott size is small, every consumer with 
dependent preferences hopes to join it!  
 
2.5 Social group effect: the case of independent consumers 
 
Consider the case of second type of consumer, moral but independent ones. They reward the firms 
for adopting the code of ethical conduct. Their willingness to pay for an ethical firm’s product is 
greater than it is for the product of a firm with no ethical conduct, and is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed on (0,  β1),  β1 -  β0 > 0. It is assumed that the ratio between the valuations is equal among 
consumers. In a sense, such heterogeneity among consumers can arise for a number of reasons. It is 
consistent with what sociologists have found when discussing the self-respect of people.11 Denote the 
self-respect effect of moral behaviour as 
 
                                                                𝛥𝛽 = 𝛽1 − 𝛽0.                                                             (10) 
 
Even when such consumers are independent on their personal judgements, they still appreciate the 
initiative of other consumers in organising a boycott but less enthusiastically. Let their valuation be 
denoted by γ ≤ 𝛼. Such consumers, too, derive utility of the social actions of others. Then, the indirect 
utility functions of the consumers (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) with 𝑥𝑖 participating and 𝑥𝑗 not participating are  
 
                                𝑢𝑖 = β1(1 − 𝑥𝑖) + γ𝑋 − 𝑝𝐻;        𝑢
𝑗 = β0(1 − 𝑥𝑗) − 𝑝𝐿 .                          (11) 
 
The decision whether to buy and at what firm is based on a cost-benefit evaluation by each consumer. 
It will not be the case that all who appreciate the social group identity will buy at the H-firm. Some 
potential customers of the H-firm may opportunistically abstain from group membership.  
                                                          
11 The notion of self-esteem found an eminent place in social psychology long ago. Franks and 
Marolla (1976) conceptualised self-esteem in terms of an individual's own perceptions and 
appraisals of significant others in the form of social approval. 
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Unlike in Section 2.3, there are now two demand functions. Therefore, two marginal consumers can 
be identified: 𝑥𝑚 is the one that is indifferent towards buying the product of an H-firm and of an L-
firm, and 𝑥𝑛 is the marginal consumer who is indifferent towards buying the product of an L-firm and 
nothing. We expect that in the industry equilibrium, there will be a segmentation of markets; namely, 
those consumers 𝑥𝑖 with a high inframarginal utility (i.e., 0 < 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥𝑚) will buy at firm H, and those 
consumers with a lower inframarginal utility (i.e., 𝑥𝑚 < 𝑥𝑗 < 𝑥𝑛) will buy at firm L. 
The larger the boycotting group, the higher the cost of joining because the H-firm with a high ethical 
code of conduct can then have a higher price in the mixed equilibrium. An L-firm understands the 
opportunism of an H-firm and needs not to reduce its price accordingly. 
It thus holds for the marginal consumers that 
 
                                         β1(1 − 𝑥𝑚) + γ𝑋 − 𝑝𝐻 = β0(1 − 𝑥𝑚) − 𝑝𝐿,                                   (12) 
 
                                                      β0(1 − (𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛)) − 𝑝𝐿 = 0.                                              (13) 
 
It follows that the number of buyers at the H-firm and at the L-firm are (𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑛), respectively, with 
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑥𝑛 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑚 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑛 ≤ 1.  
 
When the consumers are independent, the self-respect effect and the social group effect jointly make 
the price of the H-firm exceed the price of the L-firm,  
 
                                        𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 = (β1 − β0)(1 − 𝑥𝑚) + γ𝑋.                                                 (14) 
 
While the price competition tends to reduce the market price, the social identity effect creates a wedge 
between the price of the responsible and the non-responsible firm. Indeed, while in the traditional 
model price competition reduces the prices, this need not be so when morality is priced in the market. 
The responsible firm is able to charge a price exceeding the equilibrium price which would prevail in 
the absence of the social identity effect. 
 
2.6 The industry structure under price competition 
 
The demand functions can be obtained by solving for the marginal consumers,  
 
                                                             𝑥𝑚 = 1 +
γ𝑋
𝛥𝛽
−
𝑝𝐻−𝑝𝐿
𝛥𝛽
                                                  (15) 
                                                           𝑥𝑛 =
𝑝𝐻−𝑝𝐿
𝛥𝛽
−
𝑝𝐿
𝛽0
−
γ𝑋
𝛥𝛽
 .                                            (16) 
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If one of the firms is of type H and the other is of type L, the profits of the firms are 
 
                                                                  𝜋𝐴 = 𝑝𝐴𝑥𝑚 − 𝑘𝐴                                                     (17) 
                                                                        𝜋𝐵 = 𝑝𝐵𝑥𝑛.                                                          (18) 
Eliminating the outputs, the profits are 
 
                                                        𝜋𝐻 = 𝑝𝐻[1+ 
γ𝑋
𝛥𝛽
 - 
𝑝𝐻−𝑝𝐿
𝛥𝛽
] − 𝑘𝐴                                  (19) 
                                                 𝜋𝐿 = 𝑝𝐿[ 
𝑝𝐻−𝑝𝐿
𝛥𝛽
−
𝑝𝐿
𝛽0
−
γ𝑋
𝛥𝛽
].                                   (20)  
 
Under price competition, the price reaction functions are obtained from 
                             
                                                                  
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑝𝐻
 = 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
 = 0 
and they satisfy 
                                                    𝑝𝐻 =
2𝛽1
𝛽0
𝑝𝐿 + γ𝑋                              (21) 
                                               𝑝𝐻 = −𝛥𝛽+2𝑝𝐻 − γ𝑋,                                          (22) 
 
yielding the Bertrand-Nash solution in terms of prices: 
 
                                                        𝑝𝐻 =
2𝛽1𝛥𝛽
4𝛽1−𝛽0
+
2𝛽1−𝛽0
4𝛽1−𝛽0
γ𝑋                                                   (23) 
 
                                                        𝑝𝐿 =
𝛽0𝛥𝛽
4𝛽1−𝛽0
(𝛥𝛽 − γ𝑋).                                                        (24) 
 
The corresponding output structure (𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑛) then is 
 
                                      𝑥𝐻 = 𝑥𝑚 =
2𝛽1
4𝛽1−𝛽0
+
2𝛽1−𝛽0
(4𝛽1−𝛽0)𝛥𝛽
γ𝑋                                    (25) 
 
                                      𝑥𝐿 = 𝑥𝑛 =
𝛽1
4𝛽1−𝛽0
−
𝛽1
(4𝛽1−𝛽0)𝛥𝛽
γ𝑋.                                    (26) 
 
From the result of the price of the non-ethical firm (24), it is found that the mere moral preferences 
are not sufficient to drive the non-ethical firm out of the market when consumers are independent. 
The conclusion is different when the consumers are group-dependent. We report  
 
Proposition 2.  (Weak cascade effect). The mere moral preferences are not sufficient to drive the 
non-ethical firm out of the market. A sufficiently strong group effect expected by the firms, 
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                                                                            𝑋 ≥
1
γ
𝛥𝛽                                                       (27) 
 
is necessary to make the production of the unethical firm non-profitable.  
 
When (27) holds, the price of the non-ethical firm falls to zero and the firm finds it optimal to exit 
the market. Such a result has not been reported in the literature. There is more to it. It is sufficient 
that the firms ex ante expect a strong group effect without actually knowing whether it would 
materialise to have this result. Thus, the ex ante expectations of firms can significantly influence the 
choice of the firms’ ethical code.12 
 
Notice, moreover, that the H-firm is not able to raise the price above what is given in (23), as that 
would make the L-firm re-entry. Consumers’ discipline does not only fall on the L-firm, but the 
pricing of the H-firm is disciplined, too! 
 
 
2.7 Industry equilibrium under self-fulfilling rational expectations 
 
The industry equilibrium under rational expectations is characterised by the condition 
 
                                                                   𝑋 = 𝑥𝑚.                                                         (28) 
 
Imposing (28) into (25) and (26), the output distribution between the ethical and non-ethical firm is 
found to be 
                                                          𝑥𝑚 =
2𝛽1𝛥𝛽
𝜓
                                                          (29) 
                                                         𝑥𝑛 =
2𝛽1(𝛥𝛽−γ)
𝜓
,                                                     (30) 
 
where we have denoted 𝜓 = (4𝛽1 − 𝛽0)𝛥𝛽 − (2𝛽1 − 𝛽0)γ. The solution with both firms surviving 
is acceptable when 𝜓 > 0. From (30), we can see that the L-firm survives in the market if the intensity 
of the social group identity is restricted by the condition 
 
                                                   γ < 𝛥𝛽.                                                                   (31) 
 
                                                          
12 Notice that in this model, the consumer surplus for the marginal consumer is zero, while all non-
marginal consumers in the model of independent consumers enjoy a positive surplus. For all the non-
marginal customers with a greater effective willingness to pay, the utility from visiting firm H is 
greater than from visiting firm L. 
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Once this is so, the required condition 𝜓 > 0 is not threatened. From (29) and (30), one can find out 
the following: 
Proposition 3. In the rational expectations equilibrium, a cascade effect even based on a weaker 
social group identity favours the H-firm, though the survival of the L-firm is not excluded. 
There is some difference between the results in Sections 2.4 and 2.7. Both have the message that 
consumers can discipline the firms. However, when consumers are group-dependent, an L-firm has 
no chance of surviving. With more independent consumers, the case is more optimistic for a deviant, 
as the consumers’ power is more limited, even though the membership in a social group is valued 
also by the independent consumers. 
 
2.8 Stability of the mixed market structure 
 
The case of independent consumers has a dramatic implication when there are cost differences 
between firms adopting the ethical code. It is only the mixed equilibrium that is a stable market 
structure. Given the above candidate for the industry equilibrium, the L-firm has no incentive to 
switch its type to mimic the H-firm, as this would result in non-positive profits for both firms. The 
HL is a stable mixed equilibrium. There is more to it. Suppose both firms are of type H. HH cannot, 
however, be a stable equilibrium. Such a corner solution is ruled out. Both firms gain if one of them 
(but not both) switches to L. The firm with a greater ethical code cost has the greater incentive to 
switch—an obvious case for secret contracting! 
 
Proposition 4. In the case of independent consumers and differences in the cost of ethical code, the 
mixed industrial structure represents the only stable equilibrium. 
 
An equilibrium of type HL is thus stable, and the consumers are helpless in trying to persuade both 
firms to choose the high moral standard. A strong group identity effect is not enough. The scope for 
opportunism prevails. 
 
 
3. Large firms and small firms: stochastic revelation 
 
In Section 2, firms’ size was different for endogenous reasons. Even when the L-firm survived in the 
market, firms had different market shares. The chances of L-firm’s survival was conditional on 
consumers’ moral preferences. The markets punished a non-ethical firm with a loss of customers. 
The firm size (capacity) may, however, be different for ex ante reasons, too. Firms differ in their 
abilities to innovate and in their differential managerial and workers’ skills. Some grow and become 
large. Others remain small. It follows that consumers’ abilities to monitor firms in different size 
classes may be different. A firm that has extensive and repeated interactions with consumers or the 
surrounding society may be more easily detected when adopting shaky business ethics. A firm with 
less links to the rest of society may, however, be more seldom detected for fraud. 
14 
 
 
 
The analysis in the previous section abstracted from the consumers’ imperfect ability to monitor the 
firms. Instead, perfect monitoring and cost-free observability of the firms’ ethical code was assumed. 
The consumers, the activists in particular, and today’s larger audience, however, can monitor large, 
say global firms more than they can monitor the small local ones. 13 The small local firms have much 
fewer customers, and also fewer workers. The activists tend to specialise in monitoring the large firms 
in particular.14 
 
In this section, both the assumption of the firms’ homogeneity and of perfect monitoring are relaxed. 
Therefore, differentiated detecting probabilities are introduced, say 𝑝 > 𝑞, for both the large and the 
small firms. It will turn out that whether the product is a necessity or not has some role to play. 
 
3.1 Large firms 
 
In the model world of the paper, the inherited size difference in terms of capacity constraints are 
introduced. There is one large and one small firm as operative in the industry. The model is built on 
the view that the strategic interaction between the large (international) firm and the small (local) firm 
is limited in that the small firm is a price-taker with regard to the large firm’s pricing. This means 
that although the firms compete in the marketplace for the customers by their image, the small firm 
is unable to impact the strategy of the large firm. Though the firms have a fixed capacity, they 
optimise in terms of how much to sell, potentially leaving some output unsold at zero cost. The 
question is how the two extensions of the model influence the market structure in industry equilibrium 
and the view on spreading the ethical meme in the market. 
After (imperfect) monitoring the firms’ ethical codes by their customers, the industry may have four 
different structures in equilibrium. First, consumers may assume that both firms have adopted the 
ethical code. This case arises from several possibilities. It is possible that both firms have indeed 
chosen the ethical code. It is also possible that only one of them has chosen it or that neither has 
chosen it, but that the consumers did not catch the deviator. This case is thus analysed as if both firms 
were ethical. Second, it is possible that either the small or the large firm has deviated and is revealed. 
Finally, it is possible that both firms have deviated and that both are revealed. 
To gain an intuition, suppose for a moment, if only for the sake of illustration, that both firms were 
ethical and of equal size, but cannot adjust their capacity output. The mutual competition of the 
Bertrand type would result in zero equilibrium price, regardless of whether there are more or fewer 
buyers than products produced and available for the consumers. The standard undercutting argument 
                                                          
13 In the past, large firms in particular were often accused of unethical strategies and of misusing 
their economic power. This may have changed by now. Global communication techniques have 
developed through the internet, and the transmission of information has become highly efficient. In 
the end, even Volkswagen and Renault were caught. 
14 This can be motivated by the potential externalities caused by large firms, which can be much 
more harmful than those of the small firms. In Innes (2006), the gain of the Environmental 
Organizations from monitoring large firms is reported to be greater than from monitoring small 
firms. 
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applies. Thus, both firms would have a strong incentive to avoid the cost of ethical code of conduct 
adopting the unethical code in the first place. Imperfect observability might make this choice 
attractive. Under size differences, the large firm could consider itself to be a monopolist of sorts—
the small one could not capture the consumer market, no matter what it does. The customers of the 
large firm—most of them—would have no possibility of switching to the small firm. For them, the 
choice would be either buying from the large firm at the personal cost of losing their favourable social 
identity, or abstaining from buying altogether. Both choices would reduce the market price, making 
the large firm consider its choice whether to be of type H or type L in the first place. Many customers 
stay with it if the product were a necessity, i.e., a high-β product.  
With the detection probability p, the expected profit of the large L-firm is given by the weighted 
average of an unrevealed and a revealed firm, 
 
                                                             𝐸[𝜋𝐿] = (1 − 𝑝)𝜋𝐻
𝐿 + 𝑝𝜋𝐿
𝐿 ,                                               (32) 
 
where the super index L (= large) refers to the size of the firm, and the sub indices H and L to its 
ethical code perceived by its customers, like in Section 2. 
Suppose that an unrevealed but unethical large firm prices its product as 𝑝𝑀. It obtains 𝑥𝐴 customers, 
where 𝑥𝐴 is solved from 
 
                                                        β(1 − 𝑥𝐴) = 𝑝𝑀.                                                             (33) 
 
Here β stands for the valuation of the product under “veil of ignorance”. No group punishment is 
present as the firm is unrevealed from cheating. The number of its customers is then solved from (33) 
as 
 
                                                               𝑥𝐴 = 1 −
𝑝𝑀
β
.                                                                   (34) 
 
The profit of the unrevealed large firm of type L (mis-classified as type H, call it h) is then 
 
                                                         𝜋ℎ
𝐿 = (1 −
𝑝𝑀
β
) 𝑝𝑀.                                                              (35) 
 
and its profit-maximising price is  𝑝𝑀 =
β
2
.  In summary, the price, the sales, and the realised profit 
are 
                                            𝑝𝑀 =
β
2
, 𝑥𝐴 =
1
2
, 𝜋ℎ
𝐿 =
β
4
.                                                           (36) 
 
These conclusions hold, given that the firm has sufficient capacity to satisfy the demand. If the 
capacity is not sufficient, some customers are not served. 
Assume now instead that the large firm that had not chosen the ethical code was captured. The 
customers (most of them) do not have the option of switching to buy at another firm. The only way 
to boycott is to abstain from buying. If none of them boycotts (say, because the product is a necessity), 
the number of customers is the same as above, 𝑥𝐴 =
1
2
, and so is the profit, 𝜋𝐻
𝐿 =
β
4
. 
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However, if the product is not a necessity for all customers (small β case) and a boycott is organised 
against the firm with a marginal group member, say 𝑥𝑟, the indifference condition for the marginal 
participating customer is 
 
 
                                                              β(1 − 𝑥𝑟) − 𝛼𝑋 = 𝑝𝑀                                              (37) 
 
In (37), the variable X is the number of boycotting customers. This time, there is a minus sign in front 
of it, as it measures the lost private benefit for a consumer from not joining the boycott.  
 
How is the number of boycotting customers X determined? It is simply equal to the number of non-
buying customers, i.e., it coincides with 1 − 𝑥𝑟. Then, the solution for the number of buying 
customers is  
 
                                                     𝑥𝑟 = 1 − 𝑝𝑀/( β − 𝛼).                                                (38)  
 
Maximising the profit 𝜋𝐿
𝐿 = 𝑥𝑟𝑝𝑀 gives the price, the sales, and the profit for the large deviating firm:  
 
                                           𝑝𝑀 =
 β−𝛼
2
, 𝑥𝑟 =
1
2
, 𝜋𝐿
𝐿 =
 β−𝛼
4
 .                                             (39) 
 
Comparing the price, sales, and profits of a large uncaptured firm and a captured one, one discovers 
that the captured firm suffers in terms of reduced profit to the extent that the potential customers value 
the social group identity, 𝛼. 
 
Proposition 5. (Powerful cascade effect) The large firm, having chosen the unethical code and having 
been captured, is subject to a rather substantial punishment from the moral consumers, or those 
consumers who are subject to the group identity effect and who do not find its product a necessity. Its 
price drops substantially, and it accumulates an unsold inventory.  
 
Even the large firm, however, is captured probabilistically. If it is of type H, it obtains the (gross) 
profit 𝜋𝐻
𝐿  with a probability of 1, but it obtains an even higher profit if it is of type L but is not caught 
(with probability 1-p), as it avoids the cost, k. Comparing the cases of a large H-firm and 
probabilistically revealed large L-firm, it pays for the large firm to choose the ethical code if  
 
                                                𝜋𝐻
𝐿 ≥ 𝑝𝜋𝐿
𝐿 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜋ℎ
𝐿.                                                       (40) 
 
Carrying out the comparison, this condition can be developed as  
 
                                                                     𝑝 ≥ 𝑝∗ = 4𝑘/𝛼.                                                       (41) 
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Therefore, 
Proposition 6. If the catching probability of a large firm is large, it chooses to be of the ethical type 
unless the cost of the ethical choice is large or the lost group identity effect is limited. 
 
3.2 Small firms 
 
The small firm is in a rather different situation when compared with its large competitor. When 
choosing its ethical code, it takes the strategy of the large firm as a given. It knows that the large firm 
is either of type H or type L, but that in the latter case it is caught only probabilistically. However, it 
is only the price charged by the large firm that matters for the small firm. The small firm maximises 
its profit subject to the constraint knowing that its price cannot exceed the price of the large firm. It 
cannot attract many customers of the large firm as its capacity is limited. 
To formalise, assume that the large firm has chosen its price and it is 𝑝𝑀. The expected profit of a 
small non-ethical firm then is  
 
                                                              𝐸[𝜋𝐿
𝑆] = (1 − 𝑞)𝜋𝐻
𝑆 + 𝑞𝜋𝐿
𝑆 ,                                        (42) 
 
where q is the probability for the small firm of being caught. An ethical or unrevealed unethical small 
firm prices its product as 𝑝𝑁 ≤  𝑝𝑀. An ethical small firm is able to sell its capacity output, say Q, as 
long as its price is marginally below the price of the large firm. Its profit is 
 
                                                                 𝜋𝐻
𝑆 =  𝑝𝑀𝑄 − 𝑘.                                                        (43) 
 
On the other hand, a small unethical firm is able to sell all of its output as long as there are a sufficient 
number of customers, say 𝐾 ≤ 𝑄, who are not concerned about their group identity, and as long as 
its price satisfies 𝑝𝑁 ≤  𝑝𝑀. In this case, the profit of the unethical small firm is 
                                                                   𝜋𝐿
𝑆 =  𝑝𝑀𝐾.                                                             (44) 
 
The condition for an incentive to adopt the ethical code for a small firm then is expressed as 𝜋𝐻
𝑆 ≥
𝐸[𝜋𝐿
𝑆]. Evaluating this condition, it turns out to be 
                                                                 𝐾 ≤ 𝑄 −
𝑘
𝑝𝑀
.                                                  (45) 
 
Therefore, regardless of its catching probability and adjusting to the cost/price ratio, such a small firm 
has no incentive to adopt the ethical code if a sufficient number of customers do not value the group 
identity in the sense of abstaining from buying at the small firm. 
The results of the current section can be summarised as rather dramatic conclusions: 
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Proposition 7. Large firms adopt the ethical code if their catching probability is large enough. 
Regardless of its catching probability and adjusting to the cost/price ratio, a small firm has no 
incentive to adopt the ethical code if a sufficient number of customers do not value the group identity 
in terms of abstaining from buying at the small firm. 
 
As members of the society, consumers get the kind of world they deserve. The implication for the 
evolution of the market structure is somewhat surprising:  
Corollary 1. The consumer boycotts tend to lead to the evolution of the industry structures in favour 
of large firms. 
The group identity effect represents a great risk for a deviating large firm, possibly resulting in strong 
cascade effects in terms of a large boycott. Indeed, there is asymmetry as the small firms are more 
seldom “victims” of the group identity effect. 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
The question examined in this paper is whether a firm with a costly ethical conduct code can survive. 
According to the current analysis, the answer is yes if the group identity effect rewards the ethical 
code of conduct and creates cascade effects in consumers’ behaviour. People value not only the 
products they consume, but the image of the producer is often equally important. Such preferences 
have been introduced in the models of the current paper: people may undertake organised punishment 
actions against those producers who deviate from the established norm. The idea of group identity 
and its role in shaping the power of consumer alliances against the firms was based on research in 
social psychology, suggesting that people value their membership in social groups that have a 
mission. A market mechanism based on such group formation was shown to support those values, 
which help to maintain social norms and social capital in the society. Consumer alliances and boycotts 
represent such a disciplinary function of the market mechanism. Reasons were suggested in terms of 
opportunism among consumers as to why the actions of such groups may not be effective. However, 
two reasons why they can make a difference were suggested. First, the expectations of firms 
concerning the power of the group identity effect will ex ante have an impact on the ethical choice of 
the firms. Second, and against the conventional vision, large firms may have a greater incentive than 
small firms in adopting a high ethical code. Also Volkswagen got caught. By implication, the social 
responsibility of large global firms could be extended to exporting a strong corporate culture to those 
developing countries where they operate, say through their sub-contractors.  
A subtle point is in order concerning the option of bargaining between the firms and the consumer 
alliance as suggested by Baron (2001). Why do the partners not always resort to bargaining? There 
may be two reasons. First, the catching probability of a deviating firm may not be considered large 
enough by the firm. Second, the bargaining power of the firm may be great, especially if the product 
is a necessity. There is a third reason: the coordination costs within the consumer alliance may not be 
trivial despite modern social media, which has reduced those costs substantially when compared with 
the past.  
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The current paper has examined a number of mechanisms not typically discussed by economic papers. 
Many of its results could be the subject of empirical testing. The last point to be made, however, is a 
warning. The final judgement of the values expressed in the market place always remains an issue. 
People get easily brainwashed by treacherous memes, as forcefully demonstrated by Blackmore 
(1999). Do not be blind as to the power of the market mechanisms! The markets may also support 
norms and outcomes that are socially harmful. Consumers buy and consume drugs, some drink too 
much alcohol or smoke cigarettes. Some overspeed in traffic, many of us travel too much, causing 
environmental externalities. And people vote for politicians with populist ideologies. Therefore, one 
should be aware of the imperfect ability of the markets in expressing sustainable values. Mankind 
gets the kind of world it deserves! 
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